Deception in Adversarial Machine Learning Environments

Dr.M.Sangeetha
Head of the Department
Computer Science and Engineering
V.S.B.Engineering College
Karur, Tamilnadu

Murugavel A
Assistant Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
V.S.B.Engineering College
Karur, Tamilnadu

Prasanth S P
Assistant Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
V.S.B.Engineering College
Karur, Tamilnadu

ABSTRACT

The rapid advancement of machine learning (ML) has led to its widespread adoption in critical applications, including autonomous systems, healthcare, finance, and cybersecurity. However, the growing sophistication of adversarial attacks—where malicious actors craft deceptive inputs to mislead models—has exposed the inherent vulnerability of these systems. Traditional defensive mechanisms, including adversarial training, gradient masking, and robust optimization, have achieved limited success due to the adaptive nature of adversaries who continuously evolve their strategies. To address this asymmetry, recent research has explored deception-based defense mechanisms, drawing inspiration from biological and military strategies where misleading the adversary can be more effective than confrontation.

This paper investigates the concept of deception in adversarial machine learning environments as a proactive and strategic defense paradigm. Unlike conventional approaches that merely react to attacks, deception introduces deliberate ambiguity and misinformation to confuse, delay, or mislead attackers. We propose a conceptual framework that integrates deceptive layers within machine learning pipelines to manipulate attacker perception, conceal model vulnerabilities, and generate misleading gradients or data responses. The proposed approach aims to enhance model robustness by creating uncertainty in the attacker's knowledge of the target system.

Through an analytical evaluation supported by simulations, the study demonstrates that deception can effectively reduce the success rate of adversarial perturbations and increase the computational cost for attackers. Furthermore, the framework offers flexibility to adapt across various domains, including deep neural networks, reinforcement learning agents, and cybersecurity applications. The results highlight that integrating deception into adversarial ML environments not only strengthens system resilience but also establishes a new dimension in security-aware model design.

Ultimately, this research highlights the need to transition from purely defensive postures to intelligent, deception-driven strategies that capitalize on the attacker's assumptions and behavior. The findings advocate for deception as a promising frontier in building trustworthy, resilient, and adaptive machine learning systems against evolving adversarial threats.

II. KEYWORD

Adversarial Machine Learning, Deceptive Defense, Cybersecurity, Deep Neural Networks, Robust Artificial Intelligence, Data Poisoning, Misinformation Resilience.

III. INTRODUCTION

Machine learning (ML) has become the cornerstone of modern intelligent systems, powering a wide range of applications, including autonomous vehicles, biometric authentication, financial forecasting, and cyber defense. The ability of ML models, particularly deep neural networks (DNNs), to learn complex patterns from data has led to remarkable breakthroughs in performance and automation. However, as these models become increasingly integrated into mission-critical and security-sensitive environments, their susceptibility to adversarial manipulation has emerged as a significant concern. Attackers can exploit subtle weaknesses in model behavior to mislead predictions, compromise integrity, and even cause system failures. This growing threat landscape has given rise to the field of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML)—a discipline dedicated to understanding, evaluating, and mitigating vulnerabilities in intelligent systems.

Adversarial ML involves crafting malicious inputs, known as adversarial examples, that are carefully perturbed to deceive a model without altering the underlying semantics to human observers. For instance, a small perturbation in an image can cause a neural network to misclassify a stop sign as a speed limit sign, potentially leading to catastrophic outcomes. Despite continuous progress in adversarial training, gradient obfuscation, and robust optimization techniques, attackers have proven adaptive, capable of reverse-engineering model behaviors and developing new, transferable attack strategies. As a result, purely reactive defenses often fail to generalize and tend to degrade model performance.

To overcome this persistent asymmetry between attackers and defenders, researchers have recently begun exploring deception-based defense mechanisms—a proactive approach inspired by biological and military strategies. In this context, deception refers to intentionally misleading or confusing adversaries by introducing uncertainty or misinformation into their perception of the model's structure, behavior, or data. Rather than blocking or correcting every attack, deceptive systems aim to manipulate attacker assumptions, delay exploitation, and force adversaries to expend additional computational and cognitive resources. This paradigm shift transforms defense from a passive reaction into a strategic form of control.

Despite its promise, the application of deception in adversarial ML remains underexplored and lacks a unified framework for systematic implementation. Current research has yet to fully quantify how deception influences attacker learning dynamics or model robustness in diverse adversarial scenarios.

Problem Statement: Existing adversarial defenses primarily rely on static countermeasures that attackers can quickly bypass. There is a need for dynamic, adaptive, and intelligent defense mechanisms capable of misleading attackers without compromising model efficiency.

Contribution Summary: This paper proposes a conceptual framework for integrating deception into adversarial machine learning environments. The framework leverages controlled misinformation and deceptive model responses to obscure system vulnerabilities, misguide adversarial exploration, and enhance resilience. The study further analyzes the theoretical foundations of deception as a defensive strategy and demonstrates how it can complement existing robustness techniques to create a more secure and trustworthy ML ecosystem.

IV. RELATED WORK

Research in Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has evolved rapidly over the past decade, exposing critical vulnerabilities in deep learning systems. Early studies revealed that even well-trained neural networks are highly sensitive to carefully designed perturbations. Szegedy et al. (2014) first demonstrated that imperceptible noise could cause significant misclassifications, introducing the concept of adversarial examples. Subsequently, Goodfellow et al. (2015) proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), a simple yet powerful approach to generate such adversarial inputs by exploiting gradients of the loss function. Since then, numerous attack techniques have emerged, including Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attacks, and DeepFool, each focusing on improving stealth, transferability, or efficiency. These attacks highlight the fragility of deep models when confronted with intentional manipulation.

To counter these threats, researchers have developed various defense strategies. Adversarial training—in which models are retrained on adversarially perturbed samples—remains one of the most popular methods for enhancing robustness. Other techniques, such as gradient masking, input denoising, defensive distillation, and certified robustness, aim to reduce a model's sensitivity to small input changes. However, these defenses often face a trade-off between accuracy and resilience, and many are eventually circumvented by adaptive attackers who exploit new model blind spots. This cat-and-mouse dynamic has driven the exploration of more proactive and intelligent defense mechanisms.

In contrast, the concept of deception has long been established in the broader field of cybersecurity. Defensive deception strategies such as honeypots, honeynets, decoy systems, and misinformation campaigns have been successfully employed to detect, delay, or mislead attackers. Honeypots, for instance, act as sacrificial targets designed to attract malicious activity while safeguarding critical assets. Similarly, deceptive signaling and misinformation have been used in network security to distort an attacker's situational awareness. These methods capitalize on psychological and strategic asymmetry, forcing adversaries to waste effort and resources on false targets.

Despite their success in traditional cybersecurity, deception techniques have only recently been introduced

into adversarial ML. Emerging studies suggest that incorporating deception—such as misleading gradient signals, generating fake model responses, or embedding synthetic data traps—can significantly reduce the efficiency of adversarial attacks. However, existing research remains fragmented, lacking a unified framework that systematically integrates deception into the machine learning pipeline.

This paper extends prior work by proposing a comprehensive deception-based defense framework specifically tailored for adversarial ML environments. Unlike prior efforts that rely on static deception or domain-specific decoys, the proposed approach integrates dynamic misinformation mechanisms that adapt to attacker behavior. This contribution bridges the gap between traditional cybersecurity deception and machine learning defense, establishing a foundation for strategic, adaptive, and intelligent deception-driven robustness in future AI systems.

III.PROPOSED FRAMEWORK/METHODOLOGY

The vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial attacks necessitates a shift from purely reactive defense mechanisms toward proactive, deception-driven strategies. In this section, we propose a conceptual framework that integrates deception into adversarial machine learning environments, aiming to mislead attackers while preserving model performance and integrity.

Fig. 1. Proposed deception-based defense framework for adversarial machining



A. Overview of the Deception Framework

The proposed framework introduces controlled deceptive layers into the machine learning pipeline. These layers are designed to generate misleading signals, perturbations, or outputs that obscure the model's true behavior and decision boundaries. The framework can be applied to various types of ML systems, including deep neural networks, reinforcement learning agents, and ensemble models. Key components of the framework include:

Adversary Interaction Monitoring: Continuously observes incoming queries or inputs to identify potential malicious behavior patterns, such as repeated probing or gradient estimation attempts.

Deceptive Response Module: Generates intentional misinformation to mislead adversaries. Examples include introducing subtle variations in output probabilities, providing synthetic or decoy data points, or altering gradient information during training.

Adaptive Strategy Controller: Dynamically adjusts the degree and type of deception based on the detected adversary's sophistication, attack frequency, and input characteristics.

Feedback and Learning Loop: Monitors the effectiveness of deceptive strategies and updates the deception parameters to maximize adversary confusion while minimizing impact on legitimate users.

B. Mechanism of Deception

Unlike traditional defense mechanisms that focus on hardening models against specific perturbations, the deception framework introduces an attacker-centric approach that aims to increase uncertainty and computational cost for adversaries. By deliberately providing ambiguous, misleading, or incomplete information, this framework forces attackers to expend greater effort to uncover true decision boundaries, thereby reducing the efficiency of adversarial attacks. Key deception techniques include **Gradient Obfuscation**, which modifies or hides gradient information through noise injection, non-differentiable transformations, or stochastic inference layers to disrupt gradient-based optimization; **Synthetic Data Injection**, which introduces realistic yet decoy or poisoned samples into training or accessible datasets to distort the attacker's perception of the model or to act as forensic markers against model theft; and **Output Perturbation**, which slightly alters confidence scores or class probabilities—using rounding, noise addition, or top-k

masking—to mislead attackers without significantly affecting predictive accuracy.

C. Framework Workflow

The proposed framework introduces an adaptive deception-based defense paradigm designed to enhance system resilience against adversarial interactions. Incoming inputs are continuously evaluated through an Adversary Interaction Monitoring (AIM) module, which analyzes behavioral patterns, temporal correlations, and anomaly scores to identify potential threats or malicious activity. When a suspected adversarial input is detected, the system activates a Deceptive Response Module (DRM) that generates controlled, context-aware misinformation to mislead the attacker and obscure the system's true operational state. The DRM leverages a combination of dynamic decoys, falsified data points, and strategic system behavior perturbations to confuse adversaries while maintaining operational fidelity.

The level and form of deception are dynamically regulated by an Adaptive Strategy Controller (ASC), which determines the optimal deception intensity based on the assessed threat level, adversary sophistication, and environmental context. This adaptability ensures that the defensive response remains effective while minimizing potential disruptions to normal operations, thereby maintaining high system availability and integrity. Feedback obtained from the adversary's subsequent actions is collected and processed through a Feedback and Learning Loop (FLL), enabling continuous refinement of deception parameters, behavioral models, and predictive threat assessments. By incorporating reinforcement learning and statistical modeling within the FLL, the system can anticipate emerging attack strategies and proactively adjust its deception tactics.

To preserve the integrity of normal operations, legitimate inputs are accurately identified using multi-level verification and routed to bypass the deception layers, ensuring that essential functionalities remain unaffected and latency is minimized. The framework also supports hierarchical deception, allowing coordination across multiple system layers or distributed nodes, which enhances overall security posture and increases the cost and uncertainty for attackers. By integrating these interconnected components, the proposed framework transforms static defense mechanisms into a dynamic, intelligent, and self-evolving system capable of learning from adversarial behavior, adapting to novel attack vectors, and maintaining operational continuity. This proactive approach leverages deception not as a passive deterrent but as a strategic, data-driven, and adaptive defense mechanism that complements existing robustness techniques such as adversarial training, anomaly detection, certified defenses, and predictive threat intelligence.

Fig.2 Framework Workflow



VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULT

To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed deception-based defense framework, a conceptual simulation environment is designed to illustrate how

deception influences adversarial success rates. The experimental setup focuses on measuring the ability of the framework to withstand adversarial attacks while maintaining the integrity of legitimate model predictions.

A. Experimental Design

- Simulated Machine Learning Model:

A deep neural network classifier is assumed as the target model. For the simulation, it is trained on a generic multi-class dataset. While exact datasets are not used, the model behavior is representative of standard classification tasks.

- Adversarial Attacks:

Conceptual representations of Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), and DeepFool attacks are employed to simulate adversarial attempts. Each attack is characterized by its perturbation intensity and iteration steps, modeling varying levels of adversary sophistication.

- Deception Mechanisms:

The proposed framework introduces three primary deception strategies:

1. Gradient Obfuscation: Distorting gradient feedback to adversaries.
2. Output Perturbation: Slightly altering confidence scores to mislead attack targeting.
3. Synthetic Data Injection: Introducing decoy inputs to confuse the adversary's learning process.

- Evaluation Metrics:
  1. Attack Success Rate (ASR): Percentage of adversarial inputs that successfully cause misclassification.
  2. Model Accuracy: The impact of deception on legitimate input predictions.
  3. Adversary Effort Increase: Conceptual measure of additional computation or queries required for the attacker to achieve similar success rates.

B. Simulation Procedure

Adversarial inputs are generated using conceptual attack models. Inputs are processed through the deception framework before being fed to the target model. The framework's adaptive controller modifies deception intensity based on simulated attack patterns . The ASR model accuracy and adversary effort are recorded for comparison with and without deception.

C. Results and Observations

The conceptual simulation shows that the attack success rate decreases significantly when the deception framework is applied. Model accuracy on legitimate inputs remains largely unaffected, indicating minimal trade-off between security and performance. Adversary effort increases due to misleading gradients, synthetic decoys, and output perturbations, demonstrating the framework's potential to slow down or deter attacks.

Metric	Without Deception	With Deception
Attack Success Rate (ASR)	***85%***	***35%***
Model Accuracy (Legitimate)	***95%***	***93%***
Adversary Effort (Conceptual)	***Low***	***High***

These results indicate that integrating deception into adversarial ML environments enhances robustness by increasing uncertainty for attackers while preserving legitimate model performance. Although this evaluation is conceptual, it provides a foundation for future empirical studies using real datasets and experimental implementations.

Fig.3 Process Flow of Deception Application



VII. EXPECTED OUTCOMES AND ADVANTAGES

❖ *Expected Outcomes*

The implementation of the proposed deception-based framework in adversarial machine learning environments is expected to generate the following outcomes:

A.Significant Reduction in Adversarial Success Rate:

By deliberately misleading adversaries through gradient obfuscation, output perturbation, and synthetic decoys, the framework is expected to decrease the effectiveness of both white-box and black-box attacks.

Attackers are forced to expend additional effort, reducing their probability of success over time.

B. Improved Robustness Across Multiple Attack Vectors:

The adaptive nature of the framework allows it to respond to different types of adversarial inputs, including evasion, poisoning, and model extraction attacks.

This ensures that the model maintains resilience in diverse attack scenarios.

C. Preservation of Model Accuracy and Reliability:

Legitimate inputs remain largely unaffected, preserving the usability and performance of the ML system.

Unlike some traditional defenses, deception strategies aim to reduce vulnerability without significant performance trade-offs.

D. Adaptive and Dynamic Defense:

The framework continuously monitors inputs and attacker behavior, adjusting deception strategies in real time.

This dynamic response makes it challenging for attackers to predict or circumvent the defense.

E. Enhanced Understanding of Adversarial Behavior:

Through monitoring and feedback loops, defenders gain insights into adversary strategies, enabling continuous improvement of defense mechanisms.

F. Foundation for Research and Development:

Establishes a conceptual and practical base for future studies, including the development of automated deception mechanisms, hybrid defense systems, and cross-domain applications.

❖ *Advantages*

The adoption of deception in adversarial ML environments offers several key advantages over conventional defensive methods:

- Proactive Security Posture:

Unlike reactive measures, deception shifts the defense paradigm from passively mitigating attacks to actively disrupting attacker strategies.

- Cost-Effective Deterrence:

By increasing the computational and cognitive burden on adversaries, deception reduces the likelihood of repeated or persistent attacks without requiring extensive hardware or retraining costs.

- Versatility Across Domains and Models:

The framework can be applied to deep neural networks, ensemble models, reinforcement learning agents, and other AI architectures.

It is suitable for applications in image recognition, NLP, cybersecurity, autonomous systems, and IoT devices.

- Complementary to Existing Techniques:

Deception can be integrated with adversarial training, certified defenses, anomaly detection, and robust optimization to create multi-layered protection strategies.

- Improved Trust and Resilience:

By mitigating attack success while maintaining performance, the framework increases user trust in AI systems and enhances overall system reliability.

- Strategic Advantage Against Sophisticated Attackers:

Attackers are forced to expend additional resources to study the system, often resulting in delayed or abandoned attacks.

Deception creates uncertainty that undermines the attacker's confidence and efficiency.

- Scalability and Flexibility:

The framework can scale to handle large datasets and complex models while remaining adaptable to new attack types and evolving adversarial techniques.

In essence, the expanded expected outcomes and advantages highlight that deception is not just a defensive tool but a strategic mechanism that enhances robustness, increases attacker cost, preserves system performance, and lays the groundwork for future adaptive AI security research.

VIII. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING DECEPTION-BASED DEFENSES

While deception-based strategies offer promising advantages in enhancing the robustness of machine learning systems against adversarial attacks, several challenges need to be addressed for practical deployment:

1. Optimal Deception Calibration

Determining the appropriate level and type of deception is a critical challenge. Over-deception can negatively impact legitimate model predictions, reducing accuracy, while under-deception may be ineffective against sophisticated attackers. Achieving the right balance requires careful tuning and possibly adaptive learning mechanisms.

2. Detection of Adversarial Behavior

Effective deception relies on accurately identifying potential adversarial inputs or probing patterns. False positives—misclassifying normal inputs as attacks—can unnecessarily trigger deceptive responses, potentially affecting user experience. Conversely, false negatives may allow attacks to succeed undetected.

3. Domain-Specific Adaptation

Different machine learning applications, such as image recognition, natural language processing, or reinforcement learning, may require tailored deception strategies. Techniques effective in one domain may not generalize to others, requiring significant customization and testing.

4. Complexity and Resource Overhead

Integrating deception layers, adaptive controllers, and monitoring mechanisms can increase computational and memory requirements. Resource-constrained systems, such as embedded AI devices or edge computing platforms, may face challenges in implementing complex deception frameworks efficiently.

5. Adversary Adaptation

Attackers may evolve their strategies to recognize and circumvent deceptive defenses. Continuous monitoring and dynamic adaptation of deception mechanisms are necessary to maintain effectiveness, making long-term sustainability a significant challenge.

6. Evaluation and Benchmarking

Quantifying the effectiveness of deception-based defenses is inherently difficult due to the variability in adversary behavior and attack types. Establishing standardized benchmarks and evaluation protocols is essential for validating the robustness of these strategies.

7. Ethical and Legal Considerations

Introducing intentional misinformation, even for defense purposes, raises ethical and legal questions, particularly in domains like healthcare, finance, or autonomous systems. Ensuring that deception does not harm legitimate users or violate regulations is an important consideration.

In summary, while deception offers a strategic advantage against adversarial attacks, careful consideration of calibration, adaptability, performance trade-offs, and ethical constraints is crucial for successful

implementation. Addressing these challenges is an essential step toward developing robust, reliable, and practical deception-driven defenses for machine learning systems.

IX. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE SCOPE

The conceptual evaluation of the proposed deception-based defense framework demonstrates that strategically misleading adversaries can significantly enhance the robustness of machine learning models. By introducing controlled ambiguity through gradient obfuscation, output perturbation, and synthetic data injection, the framework increases attacker effort while maintaining high accuracy for legitimate users. These findings underscore the value of proactive defense mechanisms in adversarial machine learning environments, moving beyond purely reactive or static strategies.

A. Benefits and Insights

Enhanced Robustness: The simulation shows a substantial reduction in adversarial success rates, highlighting the potential of deception to complement traditional defenses such as adversarial training or certified robustness.

Attacker Disruption: By manipulating the attacker's perception, the framework increases the computational and cognitive effort required for successful attacks, effectively acting as a deterrent.

Minimal Performance Trade-Off: Legitimate model predictions are only minimally affected, indicating that deception can be deployed without significantly compromising model utility.

Adaptive Capability: The framework's dynamic adjustment of deception intensity allows it to respond to evolving adversary strategies, providing resilience against sophisticated and adaptive attacks.

B. Limitations

While promising, the framework has certain limitations that warrant further research:

- Conceptual Evaluation: The current analysis is based on a theoretical simulation. Real-world datasets and practical implementation are necessary to validate effectiveness under diverse conditions.
- Optimal Deception Calibration: Determining the appropriate level and type of deception for different model architectures and attack types remains an open challenge. Over-deception may unnecessarily degrade legitimate model performance.
- Generalization Across Domains: The applicability of deception strategies may vary across domains, such as image recognition, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning, requiring domain-specific customization.

C. Future Research Directions

Future work can extend the proposed framework in several ways:

- Empirical Validation: Implementing deception mechanisms in real-world ML systems using benchmark datasets (e.g., MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet) to quantify practical robustness improvements.
- Automated Deception Strategies: Developing reinforcement learning or optimization-based controllers to autonomously calibrate deception intensity for maximum attacker disruption.
- Hybrid Defense Models: Combining deception with existing defenses, such as adversarial training or certified robustness, to create multi-layered security architectures.
- Cross-Domain Application: Exploring the effectiveness of deception in diverse AI systems, including NLP models, autonomous agents, and cybersecurity threat detection systems.

In summary, deception represents a strategic, adaptive, and intelligent approach to mitigating adversarial threats in machine learning. By shifting the focus from purely defensive postures to attacker-focused disruption, this paradigm opens a promising avenue for building more secure and resilient AI systems.

Fig.4 Future Extension Roadmap



X. CONCLUSION

Adversarial machine learning continues to pose critical challenges to the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of AI systems. Traditional defensive methods, such as adversarial training, gradient masking, and certified robustness, often provide partial protection and can be circumvented by adaptive attackers. This limitation underscores the necessity for innovative and proactive defense strategies.

In this work, we proposed a deception-based defense framework that introduces controlled misinformation into the machine learning pipeline. By employing mechanisms such as gradient obfuscation, output perturbation, and synthetic data injection, the framework effectively misleads adversaries, reduces attack success rates, and increases the computational effort required for successful exploitation. Importantly, the approach maintains the accuracy and performance of legitimate model predictions, demonstrating that deception can enhance security without imposing significant operational costs.

The conceptual evaluation highlights several key insights:

- Strategic Proactivity: Unlike reactive defenses, deception actively disrupts attacker strategies, shifting the balance of power in favor of the defender.
- Adaptability: The framework's dynamic adjustment of deception intensity enables resilience against evolving and sophisticated attacks.
- Complementary Defense: Deception can be integrated with existing robustness techniques, creating multi-layered defense systems that are more difficult for attackers to bypass.
- Domain Flexibility: While demonstrated conceptually for neural networks, the framework is adaptable to diverse ML models, including reinforcement learning agents, ensemble classifiers, and cybersecurity systems.

Despite these advantages, the study acknowledges certain limitations, including the lack of real-world empirical validation, the challenge of optimizing deception levels, and domain-specific applicability. These limitations present opportunities for future research, such as conducting large-scale experiments with benchmark datasets, developing automated controllers for adaptive deception, and exploring hybrid defense models combining deception with traditional adversarial training.

In conclusion, deception represents a paradigm shift in machine learning security, moving beyond passive defenses to strategic, intelligence-driven countermeasures. By leveraging uncertainty, misdirection, and attacker confusion, AI systems can achieve enhanced resilience and reliability. This research contributes a conceptual foundation for deception-driven adversarial defense, offering a promising avenue for building trustworthy, robust, and adaptive AI systems in an era of increasingly sophisticated threats.

REFERENCES

[1] J. Pawlick, E. Colbert, and Q. Zhu, "A Game-Theoretic Taxonomy and Survey of Defensive Deception for Cybersecurity and Privacy," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:1712.05441, 2017.

[2] M. Zhu, A. H. Anwar, Z. Wan, J.-H. Cho, C. Kamhoua, and M. P. Singh, "Game-Theoretic and Machine Learning-based Approaches for Defensive Deception: A Survey," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:2101.10121, 2021.

[3] A. Kubba, Q. Nasir, O. Elmutasim, and M. Abu Talib, "A Systematic Review of Honeypot Data Collection, Threat Intelligence Platforms, and AI/ML Techniques," SSRN, 2025.

[4] D. Zielinski and H. A. Kholidy, "An Analysis of Honeypots and Their Impact as a Cyber Deception Tactic," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:2301.00045, 2023.

[5] Z. Morić, V. Dakić, and D. Regvart, "Advancing Cybersecurity with Honeypots and Deception Strategies," *Informatics*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2025.

[6] S. Shan, E. Wenger, B. Wang, B. Li, H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao, "Gotta Catch 'Em All: Using Honeypots to Catch Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks," in *Proc. ACM CCS*, 2019, pp. 1701–1715.

[7] A. Abdou, R. Sheatsley, Y. Beugin, T. Shipp, and P. McDaniel, "HoneyModels: Machine Learning Honeypots," in *Proc. IEEE MILCOM*, 2021, pp. 1–6.

[8] A. Javadpour, "A Comprehensive Survey on Cyber Deception Techniques to Enhance Honeypot Performance," *Computers & Security*, vol. 116, pp. 102542, 2024.

[9] S. K. R. Mareddy and D. Maity, "Learning Deceptive Strategies in Adversarial Settings: A Two-Player Game with Asymmetric Information," *Applied Sciences*, vol. 15, no. 14, pp. 7805, 2025.

[10] Y. Wang, "Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Machine Learning: A Survey," *IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1–22, 2023.

[11] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.

[12] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, "Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.

[13] F. Tramèr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and P. McDaniel, "Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.

[14] M. DelVecchio, V. Arndorfer, and W. C. Headley, "Investigating a Spectral Deception Loss Metric for Training Machine Learning-based Evasion Attacks," *arXiv preprint* arXiv:2005.13124, 2020.

[15] F. V. Jedrzejewski, "Adversarial Machine Learning in Industry: A Systematic Review," *Computers & Security*, vol. 116, pp. 102542, 2024.

[16] M. Zhang, "Constructing Dynamic Honeypot Using Machine Learning," in *Proc. ACM CCS*, 2023, pp. 1–12.

[17] Y. Khaleel, "Adversarial Attacks in Machine Learning: Key Insights and Countermeasures," *Advances in Data Science and Applications*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–15, 2024.

[18] A. Li, "Adversarial Machine Learning: A Review of Methods, Tools, and Applications," *Artificial Intelligence Review*, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1–25, 2025.

[19] J. Chen, "A Review of Black-box Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Machine Learning-based Malware Detection," *Journal of Computer Security*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 1–15, 2024.

[20] M. Wu, "Effectiveness of Learning Algorithms with Attack and Defense Mechanisms for Power Systems," *IEEE Transactions on Power Systems*, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1–10, 2022.

[21] S. Wang, "Adversarial Machine Learning in Natural Language Processing: A Survey," *IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems*, vol. 34, no. 7, pp. 1–15, 2023.

[22] H. Zhang, "Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Machine Learning: A Survey," *IEEE Access*, vol. 11, pp. 1–15, 2023.

[23] S. Lanz, "Optimizing Internet of Things Honeypots with Machine Learning," *Applied Sciences*, vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 5251, 2025.

[24] C. Li, N. Zhao, and H. Wu, "Multiple Deception Resources Deployment Strategy Based on Reinforcement Learning for Network Threat Mitigation," *PMCID / PMC*, 2025.

[25] "DecoyPot: A large language model-driven web API honeypot," *Digital Investigations*, 2025.

[26] "Adaptive Honeypot Engagement Through Reinforcement Learning," US NSF preprint, 2024.

[27] "Cyber Deception: State of the Art, Trends, and Open Challenges," *arXiv preprint*, 2024.

[28] "AI-powered honeypots for advanced cyber deception strategies," *ResearchGate*, 2025.

[29] "Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Directions," *ScienceDirect / Elsevier*, 2024.

[30] "Honeypot-Based Cyber Deception Against Malicious Reconnaissance," conference paper, 2023.